This paper provides a set of detailed estimated fiscal reaction functions for a panel of twenty industrialized countries, and it discusses commonalities and differences with regard to systematic fiscal policies across countries. In general, the countries in the panel adjust tax revenues strongly in response to the public debt, and they adjust tax revenues and transfer payments, but, interestingly, not tax rates, strongly in response to output fluctuations. Some countries such as Germany appear to adjust government consumption and investment relatively strongly in response to the public debt, while the United States adjusts capital tax rates relatively strongly. In general, an increased emphasis in the theoretical literature on the effects of procyclical tax revenues and countercyclical transfer payments as automatic stabilizers may be warranted.
Introduction
In response to the failure of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Great Recession, the European Debt crisis, and the ongoing debate about …scal rules, researchers and policymakers have shown a renewed interest in understanding the systematic conduct of …scal policy. Efforts have been made at the policymaking level to simulate the e¤ects of …scal policy rules such as Germany's Schuldenbremse ("Debt brake"), and to design …scal rules which allow for a reasonable degree of anti-cyclical …scal policy. In order to design a …scal rule which has a better chance of success, it is important to understand the past behavior of …scal policy-particularly anti-cyclical …scal policy (or "automatic stabilizers") and consolidation in response to the debt. It is also interesting in its own right to understand the behavior of systematic …scal policy-for instance, when comparing institutions, making forecasts, or calibrating DSGE models. With the policy debate as well as the academic literature in mind, this paper presents a set of estimated multi-instrument …scal rules for a panel of twenty OECD countries. In these rules, individual …scal instruments, i.e, di¤erent categories of government purchases, taxes, or transfers, may respond to the public debt or to the output gap. This paper …nds that transfer payments play a particularly important but underexplored role in anti-cyclical …scal policy across a panel of countries, while most consolidation in response to the debt occurs on the tax margin. Most of the previous academic literature, by contrast, has focused instead on countercyclical government purchases or procyclical tax rates as tools of stabilization policy, to the neglect of transfer payments.
Systematic …scal policy across countries has shown several commonalities and several di¤er-ences throughout recent decades. Most countries in the sample have substantially adjusted tax revenues in response to growth in the public debt, while they have appeared reluctant to adjust transfer payments in response to the public debt. Some countries (such as Germany) have also adjusted government purchases, particularly government investment, while others have not. Meanwhile, the United States has relied more than other countries upon adjustments to capital taxes in response to the public debt. In response to the business cycle, every country in the sample except for one (Italy) has shown a procyclical response of primary surpluses to the output gap. In most countries, this response has taken the form of responses of tax revenues (but not tax rates) and to transfer payments. Government purchases have tended not to respond to the output gap. Most countries have exhibited these basic patterns, although the results for individual countries sometimes di¤er in interesting ways. tradictory conclusions. While the consensus in macroeconomic modeling has turned toward modeling monetary policy as following an interest rate rule following Taylor (1993) , there has been somewhat less consensus with respect to how to model systematic …scal policy. The latter is complicated by a multiplicity of possible …scal aggregates or …scal instruments, each of which might operate through di¤erent economic channels. The empirical literature has already described the behavior of de…cits, total revenues, or total spending in response to the business cycle and/or the public debt. Bohn (1991) , using a VECM approach, …nd a signi…cant role for adjustments to taxes and to total spending in the United States in response to the public debt since 1791. Taylor (2000) proposes a …scal policy rule (a "…scal Taylor rule") which allows for a procyclical response of …scal surpluses to the output gap. Auerbach (2002) estimates a two-instrument …scal rule featuring revenues and spending and replicates the results of Bohn (1991) for the postwar period.
While the early literature focuses mostly on the United States, the later literature has focused more on patterns across countries. Lane (2003) provides econometric evidence that political power dispersion may positively a¤ect the procyclicality of various categories of government spending based on an estimated government spending rule, while GDP per capita may negatively a¤ect the procyclicality of government spending. Galí and Perotti (2003) estimate a set of …scal rules which allow for de…cits to respond to the output gap, past de…cits, and the level of the public debt, for a panel of countries. They …nd a clear pattern of countercyclical de…cits and error correction in de…cits, but not in the debt level, with a further look at the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods for the EMU countries. They also …nd ambiguous results with respect to the behavior of revenues and spending when taken separately. García, Arroyo, Mínguez, and Uxó (2009) …nd broadly similar results to Galí and Perotti with some exceptions. In contrast with most other studies, García et al. look at the behavior of …scal in individual countries. They caution that …scal policy across European countries appears to be strongly heterogeneous. Égert (2010) notes a general tendency for …scal de…cits in OECD countries to shrink in response to either output or the public debt, particularly when a …scal rule is estimated in …rst di¤erences, with some possible asymmetries over the business cycle. Végh and Vuletin (2012) discuss the cyclical behavior of statutory tax rates, …nding acyclical tax rates on average across countries. Bénétrix and Lane (2012) discuss the possible weakening of the link between the public debt and …scal adjustments since the adoption of the Euro, and they also point out a possible additional link between the …nancial cycle and systematic …scal policy. 1 In general, results from the empirical …scal policy literature have varied widely, with results sensitive to model speci…cation, time period, timeseries assumptions, and the aggregates and countries under study. Plödt and Reicher (2013) systematically explore the role that the choice of cyclical indicators, sample length, and timeseries assumptions on the order of integration play in estimating a particular primary surplus rule for the euro area, …nding only small di¤erences for the most part across speci…cations of that rule.
The literature has so far not generally focused on transfer payments but rather on taxes and government spending more broadly. There is some evidence which indicates that the time-series behavior of transfer payments is worth exploring. Reicher (2012) estimates a three-instrument …scal rule (i.e. a rule featuring taxes less subsidies, purchases, and transfer payments) for the postwar United States taking the endogeneity of output into account. In that study, countercyclical transfer payments count for an important share of procyclicality in the primary surplus. Methodologically, this paper extends the results of Reicher (2012) to a set of twenty OECD countries, for a wider variety of …scal instruments. This paper goes on to link the behvaior of …scal policy at the country level with the cross-sectional evidence on output stabilization, as discussed by Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Debrun and Kapoor (2010) . Both sets of authors …nd a negative relationship between government size and output volatility. This paper extends their …ndings, by showing that a high rate of taxation or particularly transfer spending seems to be related to reduced volatility in output growth.
The results from this paper have implications for the speci…cation of theoretical models of the macroeconomy. DSGE models have increasingly featured simple …scal rules, since expected future …scal policy may feed back to current economic conditions. This paper o¤ers guidance as to which components of systematic …scal policy may play an important role in those models. Previous theoretical work includes the work of Muscatelli, Tirelli, and Trecroci (2004) , who estimate a two-instrument …scal rule (i.e. a rule featuring revenue and total spending) for the United States within a New Keynesian DSGE model. They then derive its theoretical implications with respect to monetary policy interactions. Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) estimate a rich multi-instrument …scal rule for the United States in a Bayesian DSGE framework, where the underlying model has an RBC structure. They, in addition to Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) , …nd a possibly important role for the systematic conduct of …scal policy in determining the size and time path of …scal multipliers. Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012) …nd that systematic …scal policy can also a¤ect …scal multipliers, using a simple calibrated rule for government purchases. Most of these studies, however, have not focused on transfer payments. With the exception of recent work by Kumhof and Laxton (2010) , Bi and Kumhof (2011), and McKay and Reis (2013) , most of that literature has focused on the possible theoretical macroeconomic e¤ects of systematically procyclical tax rates and countercyclical government purchases, rather than countercyclical transfer payments. The …ndings from this paper suggest that researchers may bene…t from paying closer attention instead to the role of countercyclical transfer payments.
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The format of the rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the speci…cation of the …scal rule and it discusses the data sources which this study draws upon. Section 3 presents results for an estimated …scal rule covering taxes, government purchases, transfers, and other net revenue, and it also presents detailed results by category of government purchases and taxes. Section 4 discusses the statistical relationships between the prevalance of individual …scal policy instruments and output volatility, and Section 5 concludes. There is also a separate data appendix which describes the compilation of the dataset used in this paper.
2 Speci…cation and data sources
The speci…cation of the …scal rule
The …scal rule is a simpli…ed version of the multi-instrument rule of Reicher (2012). 3 Each …scal instrument i as a share of potential GDP, represented by x i;t , has three components-a component which varies according to the output gap y t , a response to the ratio of debt to potential GDP at the end of the previous year which is given by b t , plus a long-run component z i;t , such that:
The long-run component z i;t is assumed to follow an exogenous random walk with a drift parameter i . It embodies a slow-moving shifter to …scal policy which may include components such as military build-ups or draw-downs, demographic shifts, or ideological shifts. In this case it is possible to write the system (1) in …rst di¤erences, such that:
where " i;t is an iid shock. In the case of Germany, equation (2) is augmented by using a dummy variable for the structural break in 1991, which is equivalent to assuming that Germany experienced a once-and-for-all level shift in that year.
If …scal policy has a systematic e¤ect on output, then an OLS estimation of (2) produces inconsistent results. Valid instruments for output growth would include debt growth b t , the lagged output gap y t 1 , two lags of …ltered output growth y t 1 and y t 2 , and the reuni…cation dummy where appropriate. Log real GDP growth y t is detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …lter with a smoothing parameter of 100; a lower smoothing parameter removes much of what appear to be cyclical movements in output growth. The output gap in levels y t (which is used to instrument for future output growth but not in the estimation equation) is equal to HP-…ltered output with a smoothing parameter of 10. Equation (2) is then estimated using two-stage least squares. For every country, the …rst-stage regression explains output growth with a high R-squared, typically in the 0.5 to 0.7 range, and with overwhelming F statistics.
A cross-country …scal dataset 2.2.1 Main aggregates
The data series for aggregates at the country level form a panel of 20 countries, which is in turn compiled using data from a combination of OECD sources, national sources, and other sources. The construction of the panel is described in the data appendix. The series are annual, start in various years, and end in 2007 in order to avoid issues associated with the Great Recession. The series are broken out into taxes (current taxes plus contributions for government social insurance less subsidies), purchases (consumption and gross investment less consumption of …xed capital), transfers (government social bene…ts to persons), and other net revenue (a balancing item). Debt equals the previous year's end-of-year liabilities of the consolidated government sector.
Since the analysis proceeds in …rst di¤erences, it is not necessary to know the level of potential GDP in order to know the changes in …scal instruments x i;t as a share of potential GDP. Instead, changes in shares of potential GDP may be calculated using the following …rst-order approximation:
where X i;t =Y i;t is the nominal share of instrument i relative to GDP. This expression removes from x i;t the components of the growth in the share of the …scal instrument relative to GDP which are attributable to GDP growth rather than to shifts in the …scal instrument itself. Table 1 displays some summary statistics for the main aggregates as a share of GDP using the same timing convention used to arrive at (3). There is substantial cross-sectional variation in output volatility, taxes less subsidies as a share of GDP, transfer payments as a share of GDP, and debt levels, in particular. The patterns in the data are as expected, with European welfare states exhibiting higher rates of taxation and transfer payments than Korea, Japan, and the United States.
Tax rates
A set of extensions to this analysis involves estimating (2) with changes in tax rates (instead of tax levels) as dependent variables. That analysis is constrained by the availability of income-side GDP data broken out to a su¢ cient degree of detail, and it therefore features data from di¤erent time periods and for a smaller panel of countries than for the main aggregates. These tax rates are calculated in the spirit of the tax studies of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) , Jones (2002) , and Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) . Following Jones, I treat half of proprietor's income as labor income, and half as capital income. To the extent that the OECD expands its income-side GDP estimates, future work may help to revise these estimates. Data on tax instruments are obtained through the OECD's Revenue Statistics program.
The equations deriving tax rates from the OECD's aggregates are as follows, where labor and capital income are taxed on a gross basis and consumption payments are taxed on a net basis:
Capital tax rate (KTR) 
where (1100) denotes personal taxes on income and pro…ts; (1120) denotes personal taxes on capital gains; (1200) denotes taxes on corporate income; (2000) denotes total social security contributions; (2200) denotes the employer's portion of social security contributions; (3000) denotes taxes on payroll and workforce; (4100) denotes recurrent taxes on immovable property; (4400) denotes taxes on …nancial and capital transactions; (5110) denotes general taxes; (5121) equals excise taxes; (SD1R) denotes compensation of employees, received; (SB2G_B3G) equals gross operating surplus and mixed income, of which (SB3G) is mixed income; (SD2P) equals taxes on production and imports, payable; (SP3P) equals …nal consumption expenditure; and (SD4R) denotes property income received by households and nonpro…ts. Superscripts marked e pertain to the total economy; superscripts marked h pertain to the household and nonpro…ts sector; and subscripts marked g pertain to the government sector.
Results

Results for main aggregates
3.1.1 Coe¢ cients on debt: Consolidation through which instruments? Table 2 contains the estimated multi-instrument …scal rule coe¢ cients for the main aggregates, along with standard errors. In most countries, …scal authorities have appeared to increase taxes, possibly decrease government purchases, and hold transfer payments and other net revenue relatively steady in response to changes in the public debt, as re ‡ected by the b i coe¢ cients. On average, there has appeared to be a positive response of the primary surplus to increases in the public debt. While the e¤ects of the public debt for any particular country are not especially precisely estimated, the general pattern throughout the sample indicates that …scal authorities have appeared to consolidate slowly in response to …scal imbalances.
There does appear to be possible heterogeneity across countries. While there is no evidence that Finland or Japan has undertaken systematic consolidation in response to …scal imbalances during recent decades, countries such as Australia, France, Germany, and New Zealand have appeared to respond quite aggressively to …scal imbalances through consolidation. The United States appears to have responded somewhat more weakly to the public debt than Germany but more aggressively than Japan. In eighteen of the twenty countries, the government sector has appeared to increase the primary surplus in response to the public debt. There does seem to be a general tendency, noted by previous authors, in the panel for countries to engage in …scal consolidation in response to changes in the public debt.
Revised estimates for the United States indicate a smaller role for government purchases in …scal consolidation than the original estimates of Bohn (1991) , Auerbach (2002), and Reicher (2012) . This di¤erence primarily re ‡ects the choice of time periods-from 1955 onward in the current study, versus from 1791 onward in the study of Bohn (1991) and from 1946 onward in the study of Reicher (2012) . The previous studies contain spending reversals which result from war, most notably the winding-down of military spending immediately after World War II and the Korean War. The current study omits those periods. To the extent that government purchases naturally wind down after wars, one should expect reductions in government purchases following large wartime increases in the public debt. 4 The peacetime dynamics of …scal …nancing in the United States tend to place more consolidation activities into the tax domain and fewer consolidation activities into the spending domain, relative to wartime.
For the other countries, there appears to have been signi…cant heterogeneity in the responses of individual …scal instruments to the debt. Germany, for instance, has shown a pattern of spending reversals during peacetime. Interestingly, Germany is the one country in the sample where the change in the borders of that country resulted in a transitory wave of infrastructure investment during the 1990s. Germany has aggressively reversed purchases in addition to raising taxes during periods of rising debt, as to a weaker extent have the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Canada and France, like the United States, have relied more on taxes as a consolidation device. Individual estimates have come with fairly wide standard errors, but there appears to have been some possible heterogeneity in the ways in which individual countries have engaged in …scal consolidation.
There do seem to have been a few commonalities in the consolidation behavior of countries as well. Few countries have adjusted transfer payments substantially in response to debt growth. To the extent that future expected imbalances are governed by an increased demand for transfer payments in countries such as Germany and the United States, one should expect these transfer payments to be …nanced through higher taxes in both countries, with possible additional cuts to government purchases playing a role, especially in Germany. In general, the basic pattern appears to be that most countries have increased taxes and possibly decreased purchases to some degree in response to the debt. The concerns about spending reversals expressed by Corsetti et al. (2012) appear to be supported by the data to a certain extent, though the results on spending reversals vary from country to country.
The countercyclicality of …scal policy
The y i coe¢ cients in Table 2 capture the responses of individual …scal instruments to the business cycle. Several commonalities emerge. In all countries, the estimated response of the primary surplus to output has been positive, with the possible exception of Italy. Tax revenues have been procyclical in most countries; government purchases have been more or less acyclical in most countries; and transfer payments have been countercyclical in most countries. These patterns indicate that …scal responses to the business cycle are of their "expected" signs or are neutral, and the average response of primary de…cits to the cycle among countries (0.47) is of the same order of magnitude (about 0.5) as that proposed by Taylor (2000) and identi…ed by Girouard and André (2005) and Fatás and Mihov (2012) among OECD countries and by Plödt and Reicher (2013) among euro area countries.
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In the average country of the panel, the response of tax levels to the business cycle has been somewhat more aggressive than in the United States. To the extent that a high-tax country experiences business cycle ‡uctuations, the amount of tax revenue will respond more sensitively to output ‡uctuations than in a low-tax country. With regard to transfer payments a similar pattern holds. A number of countries with larger welfare states such as France and Germany apparently have featured more countercyclicality in transfer payments than the United States, although in the United States, transfer payments have featured about as much countercyclicality as in Sweden. The net result of all of this is that while the United States has featured strong and robust anti-cyclical …scal policy, of which countercyclical transfer payments are an important part, most countries in the panel appear to have featured somewhat stronger anti-cyclical …scal policy than the United States. Furthermore, procyclical tax revenues and countercyclical transfer payments, in that order, both comprise a large proportion of procyclical primary surpluses. Government purchases on average are not highly countercyclical. Table 3 contains a similar set of calculations to Table 2 , except with a focus on individual components of government purchases. Government purchases equal gross consumption plus gross investment, less consumption of …xed capital. In the United States, most consolidation activity related to government purchases in response to the public debt has occurred through changes to government consumption (and to the consumption of …xed capital) rather than to changes to government gross investment. The government sector in the United States has not apparently cut investment in response to the debt, and the evidence on government consumption is itself not particularly strong.
Spending instruments in detail
In some countries this has not apparently been the case. In particular, countries such as 5 Debrun and Kapoor (2010) , among many others, caution that this result may not hold beyond a sample of OECD countries. A large literature, which is not cited here, hints at the possibility of the procyclicality of …scal policy in developing economies.
Germany and Italy have tended to cut both government consumption and government gross investment in response to the public debt, with a number of other countries showing negative (but imprecisely estimated) coe¢ cient estimates as well. There appears to be some heterogeneity in the ways in which individual countries have carried out consolidation when that consolidation has come through adjustments to government purchases. Table 4 contains the estimated responses of di¤erent tax rate instruments to the public debt and to the business cycle. The availability of estimates is severely constrained by the availability of income-based GDP data with which to carry out the calculations described in Section 2.2.2. For the purpose of comparison, Table 4 presents estimated e¤ects of tax rates on a GDP base as well. Notably, the panel loses such major countries as Germany (where the income-based data begin in 1995, producing too short of a time series) and Japan (which is in the process of revising its national accounts), when looking at tax rates on speci…c income bases.
Tax instruments in detail
In the United States, capital income tax rates have responded strongly to the public debt and weakly to the business cycle, while labor tax rates and consumption tax rates have appeared not to respond to either the public debt or to the business cycle. Total tax rates on a GDP basis appear to respond weakly to the public debt and appear to be acyclical. The United States appears to utilize capital income taxes as its main adjustment mechanism, and it features the strongest estimated response of capital income taxes to the public debt out of the reduced panel. The role of capital taxation in the United States appears to be relatively large, although it is important to take into account the reduced sample of countries when making comparisons.
In the panel of countries, most estimated coe¢ cients have their "expected sign", with a few surprises. On average, the countries in the panel appear to have possibly adjusted all three tax instruments in response to the public debt, although the adjustment coe¢ cients have not in general been precisely estimated. Interestingly, tax rates on labor income and on consumption, but not necessarily on capital, have appeared to be acyclical. The procyclicality of capital taxes, however, is not a robust fact across countries. Altogether, the progressivity of most tax systems at an individual level has not translated into the procyclicality of average tax rates at an aggregate level. 6 Progressive tax rates at an individual level do not seem to necessarily imply strongly procyclical tax rates in a time-series sense.
4 Evidence on output stabilization Table 5 contains the results from a series of regressions with the standard deviation of output growth at a national level on the left side, and a constant, plus either the coe¢ cient y i or the sample average level of instrument i as a share of GDP x i on the right hand side. These regressions capture a reduced-form set of aggregate statistical relationships between the cyclicality and size of individual aggregates, on one hand, and output volatility on the other. As in similar studies conducted by Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Debrun and Kapoor (2010) for aggregate de…cits, coe¢ cients di¤erent from zero indicate the degree to which the properties of individual …scal instruments seem to be related to more or less stable business cycles. As in those earlier studies, these statistical relationships where they exist should not be interpreted as structural relationships, but rather as broad statistical tendencies. Unfortunately, due to the small sample size in the cross-section and due to the near-multicollinearity of certain combinations of right-hand-side variables, it is not possible to engage in a richer multivariate analysis.
The contents of Table 5 indicate that among the twenty countries from the sample, the levels of taxes and transfer payments (and, interestingly, the level of the public debt) as a share of GDP are negatively correlated with volatility in output growth in a manner which is statistically distinguishable from zero. In line with Galí (1994) , Fatás and Mihov (2001) , and the subsequent literature, there also appears to be a possible negative correlation between the level of government purchases and volatility in output growth, but that statistical relationship is not precisely estimated, and the results for di¤erent components of government purchases do not paint a clear picture. Despite the clear evidence linking a large welfare state with economic stabilization, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between any of the estimated cyclical response coe¢ cients y i and automatic stabilization. As Debrun and Kapoor (2010) point out, these coe¢ cients are not estimated with a great degree of precision, and so the regressions presented here are subject to a great degree of attenuation bias. It is therefore hazardous to make sweeping statements about y i . In general, the results in Table  5 are in line with the results of previous studies where these studies overlap. To summarize, countries with large governments, particularly large welfare states, tend to exhibit reduced volatility in output growth.
Conclusion
When looking at an estimated …scal rule in a panel of countries, there emerge a number of commonalities and a number of di¤erences. Most countries in the panel have tended to engage in …scal consolidation in response to the public debt through tax adjustments, with some countries engaging in adjustments to government purchases as well. Most countries have exhibited a tendency to avoid adjusting transfer payments in response to the public debt. In some countries, most notably Germany, consolidation within government purchases has taken the form of adjustments to government investment as well, while the United States has tended to adjust tax rates on capital income to an extraordinary degree.
Most countries in the panel have also engaged in some degree of anti-cyclical …scal policy, mostly through adjustments to the levels of taxes and transfer payments, but largely not to government purchases. On average, cyclical ‡uctuations in taxes have come through changes in the tax base rather than through changes in tax rates over the business cycle. Interestingly, a progressive tax system at the individual level in many countries has not resulted in countercyclical average tax rates. The micro and macro elasticity of tax rates with respect to income seem to di¤er. Particular caution is therefore warranted when making statements about aggregates based on individual-level features of the tax system. Countercyclical transfer payments seem to be the main instrument which varies systematically over the business cycle.
Several directions for future work become apparent. On the empirical side, the careful extension of the OECD's income-based GDP estimates would allow for extensions to Table  4 to be calculated, particularly for important countries such as Germany and Japan, and to generate better estimates for Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In addition, the estimates from this paper suggest that the choice of priors, when estimating …scal rules in a DSGE context, should allow for some coe¢ cients to take on values at or near zero, particularly those coe¢ cients which relate tax rates and purchases to the business cycle and those coe¢ cients which relate transfer payments to the public debt. On the theoretical side, an increased understanding of the role of transfer payments (and tax payments, but not tax rates) as automatic stabilizers would be warranted. Even in countries with smaller welfare states such as the United States, transfer payments comprise an important share of automatic stabilizers and hence deserve further study. Source: Author's calculations, …scal database. Variables: (1) Standard deviation of output growth; and the sample averages of (2) taxes less subsidies, (3) government purchases, (4) gross consumption, (5) gross investment, (6) consumption of …xed (7) capital, transfer payments, (8) other net revenue, (9) the primary surplus, and (10) the public debt as a share of GDP, respectively. Averages are taken between t and t 1 values for level shares, in keeping with the timing conventions used to calculate growth rates. 
- (2) - ( Tables 2 through 4 . Levels correspond with average levels reported in Table 1 .
Coe¢ cient estimates are followed by standard errors.
